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Maryland Courts
By Robert E. Cahill, Jr.
In Embrey et. al. v. Holly, -Md....
A.2d - (1982), the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld an award of pun-
itive damages against an employer
under the theory of respondeat superior
in a defamation case. The Court also
decided that under appropriate cir-
cumstances, it is proper for a trial
court to permit the jury to apportion
punitive damages among multiple de-
fendants.
The case involved a remark by
Embrey, a radio D.J. more popularly
known as Johnny Walker, during his
morning broadcast on WFBR, in Bal-
timore. The target of the comment,
then local news anchorman Dennis
Holly, alleged damage to his reputa-
tion as a result of its broadcast. Suit
was filed on his behalf against both
Embrey and Baltimore Radio Show
Inc., Embrey's employer. A jury in the
Baltimore City Court found that the
statement was defamatory, and
awarded Holly, $25,000.00 in com-
pensatory damages against both de-
fendants, as well as $5,000.00 in puni-
tive damages against Embrey and
$25,000.00 in punitive damages against
the defendant employer.
On appeal, Embrey and Baltimore
Radio Show conceded that Maryland
has adopted the view allowing assess-
ment of punitive damages in cases
where liability is vicariously imposed
upon a master as the result of the
servant's tortious conduct in the course
of employment, without regard to
the master's involvement in the tor-
tious act. However, they urged the
Court to fashion an exception to the
rule, thus prohibiting vicarious exem-
plary recovery in defamation cases.
Embrey and his employer argued that
to allow recovery against the master
in such a case would offend the spirit
of the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of expression, and would
violate the prohibition against impos-
ing "liability without fault" in defa-
mation cases announced by the Su-
preme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
The court held, however, that "it is
not error to permit the jury to impose
exemplary liability on a master for the
defamatory utterances of its servant
where the employee acted in the
scope of his employment, and with
knowledge of falsity or reckless dis-
regard for the truth." In so holding,
the Court reasoned that the Gertz
decision left state courts sufficient
leeway to impose vicarious liability in
defamation cases, stating that "there
is no constitutional shield under Gertz
for an employer acting through his
agent with actual malice, because the
employer in such a situation is the
wrongdoer."
The Court further reasoned that
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allowing a punitive damage assess-
ment against an employer in such a
situation will serve to encourage
greater employer accountability, thus
protecting the interests of Maryland
citizens in their reputations.
Finally, the Court noted the lack of
any constitutional distinction between
an award of punitive damages and
one of compensatory damages based
on vicarious liability, the latter being
clearly permissible.
The Court also deemed this an
appropriate case to permit apportion-
ment of punitive damages among the
co-defendants. In so holding, the Court
cited the admissability of evidence as
to the wealth, and the blameworthi-
ness of each co-defendant as weigh-
ing heavily in favor of a rule that
would allow a punitive award against
each co-defendant individually.
In his dissent, Chief Judge Murphy,
joined by Judges Eldridge and David-
son, argued that the test for the
imposition of punitive liability adopted
by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §909 (1976), which requires
some degree of employer "authoriza-
tion, participation, or ratification of
an employee's defamatory act "is con-
stitutionally impelled" by the holding
in Gertz. The thrust of the dissenting
position centered upon a reading of
Gertz that would require a finding of
actual fault, as opposed to one of
imputed fault before an award of pun-
itive damages could be proper in a
First Amendment case.
In Adler v. American Standard Corpora-
tion. 291 Md. 31, .A.2d-(1981), the
Court of Appeals, upon having the
question certified for its determina-
tion from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland,
opened the door to a new cause of
action in Maryland Courts: to wit,
wrongful discharge by an employer
of an at-will employee. While holding
that the averments of Adler's Amended
Complaint were conclusory, vague,
and general, the Court recognized
that an employee at will may sue his
former employer either in tort or in
contract for abusive discharge when
the reason for the discharge contra-
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venes "some clear mandate of public
policy."
As the Court explained, Adler alleged
that he was discharged solely on the
basis of the corporation's desire to
thwart Adler's efforts to disclose cer-
tain business improprieties which he
had discovered within the company,
including payment of commercial
bribes, and the falsification of finan-
cial and other business records. Adler
contended that since the acts which
precipitated his discharge, namely com-
mercial bribery and falsification of
records are in violation of the criminal
laws, see MD. ANN. CODE Art. 27 §174
(1982 rep. vol.), then a discharge to
prevent disclosure of the crimes vio-
lates public policy.
The Court found that the allega-
tions did not fully set forth facts
amounting to a violation of the crimi-
nal statute. Further, found the Court,
Adler's allegations did not otherwise
"demonstrate violation of a clear man-
date of public policy of this State."
The Court noted that "declaration of
public policy is normally the function
of the legislative branch, 'and that'
recognition of an otherwise undeclared
public policy as a basis for a judicial
decision involves the application of a
very nebulous concept to the facts of
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a given case." In short, the Court pro-
vides little guidance in defining the
type of "clear mandate of public pol-
icy" that must be contravened by the
employer in a proper allegation of
wrongful discharge. For further an-
alysis, see 10 U. of Balt. L. Rev. 256
(1981).
The Court of Special Appeals, In
Teays v. Supreme Concrete Block Inc., -
Md. App. - - A.2d - (1982), in
holding that an aggrieved employee
against whom a demurrer was sus-
tained before the Adler decision was
filed is entitled to the application of
the new law on appeal, similarly found
the plaintiff's declaration to be sub-
stantially insufficient in alleging that
the motivation of the employer in dis-
charging Teays contravened a clear
mandate of public policy.
In Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, __
A.2d - (1981), the Court of Appeals
declined to alter or to modify the
common law rule prohibiting the im-
position of dram shop liability upon a
licensed vendor of intoxicating bev-
erages who knowingly and unlaw-
fully sells liquor to an intoxicated
patron, who in turn, causes an injury
to a third party.
The Court reasoned that since the
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legislature has declined to enact a sta-
tute imposing civil liability on respon-
sible liquor vendors, the policy de-
manded by the public is satisfied by
the imposition of criminal sanctions
upon vendors found guilty of selling
intoxicants to minors or to intoxi-
cated persons. See MARYLAND CODE
ANN. Art 2B § 118(a)(1981 rep. vol.).
The Court noted that the question
"clearly impacts on the developments
relating to the dispensing and con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, a
subject long pervasively regulated by
the legislature."
In her dissent, Judge Davidson ar-
gued that "the common law rule has
become insound in the circumstances
of modern life," and that the Court
should not interpret legislative in-
action as a positive revelation con-
cerning Maryland public policy.
In Sheehan v. Anthony Pools - Md.
App.., A.2nd-(1982), the plain-
tiff sued the seller of a swimming pool
after he sustained personal injuries as
the result of falling off of a diving
board. Sheehan pursued his claim
under two theories. First, he alleged
breach of express and implied war-
ranties that the diving board was
covered with non-skid materials.
Second, he alleged strict liability,
claiming that he had been sold a
defective pool and diving board which
was unreasonably dangerous.
The trial court directed a verdict in
favor of Anthony Pools as to the war-
ranty court, citing a provision in the
sales contract which contained a dis-
claimer of implied warranties, and of
any express warranties falling out-
side of the contract itself. In submit-
ting the strict liability claim to a jury,
the trial court refused to grant a
prayer to the effect that inadvertence
of carelessness in the use of the diving
board by Sheehan was not a defense.
The Court of Special Appeals re-
versed. On the question of whether
the attempted disclaimer effectively
excluded the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for pur-
pose, the Court held that while gen-
erally the implied warranties may be
excluded or modified, the provisions
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of MD. COM. L. CODE §2.316.1 (1975)
prohibit enforcement of such an attempt,
if asserted by a seller of consumer
goods. The Court found Anthony
Pools to be a "seller" (MD. COM. L.
CODE §2-314 to 2-318), and the pool
itself to be a "consumer good" (MD.
COM. L. CODE §9-109), within the
meaning of the statute.
The Court also held that the judge's
refusal to instruct the jury that care-
lessness in the use of the diving board
by Sheehan did not constitute a valid
defense to the strict liability claim was
reversible error. Noting first that the
trial judge properly refused Anthony
Pools' request for a contributory negli-
gence instruction, the Court indicated
that the appropriate jury charge should
have included an instruction to the
effect that ordinary carelessness or
inadvertence on the part of Sheehan
would not bar his recovery, but that a
knowing, voluntary and unreasonable
assumption of the risk involved in the
use of the diving board would provide
a complete defense. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1976).
The Court concluded that "the trial
court's silence on these two aspects of
the plaintiff's conduct left the jury
bereft of essential guidance and con-
stituted reversible error."
Recent Maryland
Legislative
Developments:
" the bill seeking to raise gasoline
taxes 4.5 cents per gallon over the
next two years passed. If the whole-
sale price of unleaded gasoline rises
above $1.30, the tax will increase
automatically, but by no more than
$.01 per year. Such revenue will be
used to repair and replace Mary-
land's deteriorating highways and
bridges.
" the State's drinking age for the con-
sumption of beer and wine will be
raised from 18 years of age to 21
years of age. The bill exempts all
people who will be 18 by June 30,
1982. The primary motivation for
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raising the drinking age was to
reduce the number of automobile
accidents caused by intoxicated
motorists. The drinking age for
beer and wine was lowered from 21
to 18 in 1974.
the "Death with Dignity" bill which
would have allowed terminally ill
patients to instruct doctors not to
take extraordinary measures to pro-
long life where there is no hope of
cure did not pass. Opponents of
this bill felt that it would only legal-
ize mercy killing.
" the bill seeking to "decouple" state
taxes from federal taxes which have
made allowances providing tax
breaks for businesses, was shelved
until next year.
" the bill to raise interest rate ceilings
on most consumer loans, raising
the ceiling to 24% passed. Oppo-
nents of the deregulation bill were
successful only in amending the bill
to continue the state ban on credit
card membership fees. On January
28, 1981, Judge Marshall A. Levin
of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, ruled that the State no longer
has the right to impose interest ceil-
ings because of federal deregula-
tion. Judge Levin's decision will be
considered on appeal to the Mary-
land Court of Appeals this year.
" the bill seeking to raise interest ceil-
ings to 24% on secondary mort-
gages passed.
* the bill proposing mandatory sen-
tencing for unlawful possession of
a handgun was killed in the Judi-
ciary Committee.
" the General Assembly agreed to
raise weekly unemployment bene-
fits from $140 per week to $153 per
week.
" the bill that would prevent the
courts from automatically dismiss-
ing criminal cases that take more
than 180 days to get to trial was
killed in the final hours of the
session.
" the bill giving state's attorneys the
discretion to determine whether 16
or 17 year-olds charged with vio-
lent crimes should be tried as juve-
niles or adults, passed.
" the legislature acted to extinguish
the possibility of obtaining uncon-
tested divorces without going to
court, a method recently approved
by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Proposals to reduce the separation
period necessary to file for divorce
were also defeated.
